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ACTION TO ANNUL MARRIAGE-PITYSICAL EXAMINATION or HUSBAND.-
ANONYMOUS, 69 N. Y. Supp. 547.-This is a motion to compel the defendant
to submit to a physical examination before trial. The action is brought by a
wife to annul her marriage for fraud in that defendant represented himself to
be in good health, when in fact he was sick with a venerial disease. Motion
denied.
If necessary a physical examination, in this case, is permissible at the
proper time. McQuigan v. Railroad Co., 127 N. Y. 50; People v. Roosa, 60
N. Y. Supp. 244. An examination of this nature is only granted because of
absolute necessity where all other means of proof have failed. As the plaintiff
did not make it appear that an examination was absolutely necessary and
that she could not establish her case in any other way, the motion was
rightly denied.
ADVERSE POSSESSION-PUBLIC STREETS.-VILLAGE; oF RED JACRET T. PIN-
TON, 85 N. W. 567 (Mich.).-Defendant built a fence around his premises and
enclosed therewith a certain portion of public street. In 1890, after an undis-
turbed possession of 23 years, he erected a building which extended over por-
tion of street thus enclosed. The building was destroyed by fire, and this
action is brought to enjoin defendant from re-building. Held, the defendant's
possession was not adverse as to street, since there was an implied under-
standing between city authorities and abutter, that upon re-building the cor-
rect line would be recognized.
The only evidence to support this conclusion was that the defendant, in
1893, six years after prescriptive period had expired, recognized the street
line in constructing other buildings. The court shows a decided tendency to
seize upon all available means to avoid the rule laid down in Big Rapids v.
Comstock, 65 Mich. 75, that an individual may acquire title to public street
by adverse possession. This would indicate a leaning towards the contrary
doctrine, which is supported by the weight of authority. Dillon Mun. Corp.
Sec. 669, and cases cited.
BANKRUPTCY-APPEAL :FROM ALLOWANCE or CLAIMS-RIGHT OF CREDI-
TORS TO APPEAL.-McDANIEL ET AL V. STROUD, 106 Fed. 486.-An appeal,
by creditors, from an order of a bankruptcy court, after the refusal of the
trustee to allow the use of his name as taking the appeal should not be dis-
missed, provided the creditors had no time in which to procure an order re-
quiring such trustee to consent. Purnell, J., dissenting.
The general rule is that any party or person injured by any judgment or
decree has the right of appeal therefrom. The determination of the point here
at issue depends upon the construction of the revised bankruptcy act of 1898.
In Chatfield v. O'Dwyer, 101 Fed. 797, it was held that under the bankruptcy
327
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
act of 1898 an appeal could be taken only by the trustee or by a creditor inthe name of the trustee and under permission from the court. The present
case takes the contrary view, following in re Roche, 101 Fed. 956.
COMMoN CARRIERS-DEFECTIvE FREIGHT ELEVATOR-LANDLORD'S LIA-
BILITY.-SPRINGER V. FORD, 59 N. E. Rep. 953 (Ill.).-The owner of a build-
ing in which a freight elevator is operated, who permits an employee of his
tenant to ride thereon in the discharge of his duties, occupies the relation of a
common carrier of passengers for hire towards such employees.
The conflict of the decisions on the status of passenger and freight eleva-
tors, has been decidedly emphasized during the last few months by two notabledecisions taking opposite views on the subject. Upon the heels of the case ofGriffen v. Manice, decided by the New York Court of Appeals and commented
upon in the current volume of this Journal, page 287, comes this case whichholds the owner of a building in which a freight elevator is operated, liable as
a common carrier for hire; the hire being the rent received from the tenant.The New York case, on the contrary, considers such occupation as inadequateto create the relation of carrier and passengers, and makes the passenger,
when using the elevator, merelyaccept an implied invitation to make use of it,
when doing business on the premises. Both cases are decided on grounds of
what the courts consider public policy, but the weight of prior decisions seemsto be decidedly in favor of the illinois decision. Deposit Co. v. Soblitt, 172Ill. 222; Treadwellv. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574.
DISTRIBUTION OF PowERS OF STATE-PROBATE COURT-JURISDICTION-CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw-CITY OF JANESVILLE v. TELEGRAPH CO., 59 N. E. 781(Ohio.).-A law conferring power on the Probate Court to determine the
mode of construction of telegraph line along city streets, in case of disagree-
ment between the city and company, is not invalid as vesting legislative pow-
ers in a judicial body. Shanck, C.J., and Marshall, J., dissenting.
In a carefully considered opinion the court here squarely reverses its former
position, noted 10 YALE LAW JOURNAL 259. The defendant relied upon Ap-peal of Norwalk Ry. Co., 69 Conn. 576, in which a similar statute was de-
clared unconstitutional, but the court, after an exhaustive review, declines to
accept it as binding, following thc principle laid down in Cooper's Case, 22N. Y. 84, that when any power is conferred upon a court of justice to be ex-
ercised by it as a court, the action of such court is to be regarded as judicialirrespective of the original nature of the power.
ELECTRICITY-NEGLIGENCE-TELEPONEs---DEATH BY LIGHTNING-SAFETY
APPLIANCES-DANGEROUS PosITIox.-GRIFF ITH V. NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH Co., 380 AtI. 643 (Vt.).-A., while sitting in his library
near a telephone which he had rented of defendant, was killed by lightning
which entered over defendant's wires. Held, that the question as to whether
defendant used proper appliance to avert the danger, and the question of A.'s
contributory negligence in not kn6wing that defendant had not adopted proper
appliances to avert such a danger and in sitting near the telephone when a
storm was approaching, were for the jury.
It is the duty of electric companies to guard against injuries to person and
property by reason of electricity which may be conducted over their lines.Brown v. Illuminating Co., 45 AtI. 182; McKay v. Telephone Co., 111 Ala.337; 10 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law (second edition) 872. The court intimated




EMINENT DOMAIN-ELECTRIC SUBURBAN RAILWAY-NECESSITY or TAKING-
STATUTES.-IN RE RHODE ISLAND SUBURBAN Ry. Co., 48 Atl. 591 (R. I.).-
An electric railroad was authorized by statute to condemn land for its "cor-
porate purposes." It filed a petition to condemn a wharf lot for a power
house and coal pockets. Said wharf lot was five miles from its tracks. Held,
that the taking was not for a public use.
The taking of private property for private purposes cannot be authorized
by legislature. In re Eureka Basin Warehouse & Mfg. Co., 96 N. Y. 42. The
taking of private property for public purposes must be necessary. BIdridge
v. Smith, 35 Vt. 484. The court declares that the use to which the land
taken is put, must be essential to the public interest, and not pertain to the
private interest of the company in the detail of its business, and that as the
primary object in locating its power house and coal pockets on the said wharf
lot, five miles from its tracks, was purely one of economy, the taking of that
particular lot was not necessary for its "corporate purposes."
FACTORS-USAGE-SALE ON CREDIT.- M. M. WALKER CO. v. DUBUQUE
FRUIT AND PRODUCE CO. ET AL, 85 N. W. 614 (Ia.).-Goods were consigned,
without instructions, to be sold by a factor on commission. Held, that, in the
absence of instructions or usage to contrary, factor has implied power to sell
goods on reasonable credit.
This question has never before been adjudicated in Iowa, but the present
decision is in accord with the great weight of authority. Roosevelt v. Doher-
ty, 129 Mass. 301 ; Edgerton v. Michels, 66 Wis. 124 ; "foslin v. Cowee, 52
N. Y. 90. The court distinguishes the case at bar from Durant v. Fish, 40 Ia.
559, where sales on credit by an agent authorized to sell were held invalid.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE-EVIDENCE.-BLAnR STATE BANK v. BbNN, 85
N. W. 527 (Neb.).-A debtor sold land to one of several creditors for a fair con-
sideration in satisfaction of pre-existing debts. A re-conveyance of this prop-
erty to the wife of the grantor was later contracted for by the purchaser.
Held, that this contract could not be presumed to have been entered into for
the purpose of defrauding, hindering, or delaying other creditors in the collec-
tion of their debts.
Indulgence to the homestead rights of the destitute debtor rather than a
strict application of established principles of law seems to have produced this
decision. This is shown by the language of the judge: "We view it as a laud-
able effort to preserve the homestead to the use of the family." In the face of
McClellan v. Pyeatt, 4 U. S. App. 319, the decision cannot possibly stand as a
rule to be followed in subsequent cases. Such re-conveyance has always been
recognized as a badge of fraud; and if the homestead rights of the defendant
protect him after the re-conveyance, there was certainly no necessity of the
original transfer.
INHERITANCE TAx-DOWER- CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE. -BILLINGS V.
PEOPLE, 59 N. E. 798 (Ill.).-A devise for her benefit was renounced by the tes-
tator's widow, who elected to rely upon her common law right to dower.
Held, that an inheritance tax law imposing a tax on all property passing by
will or by the intestate laws of the State includes dowers.
The right of dower rests not upon statute, but on immemorial custom. It
is furthermore a principle, admitting of no exception, Cooley on Taxation,
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p. 244, that there must be a distinct legislative authority for every tax levied.
Litchfleld v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123. Yet dower is subjectto legislative control,
for while it is true that the husband cannot deprive his wife of her inchoate
right of dower, the State may. Rand v. Keiger, 23 Wall. 148. Holding there-
fore, not by contract but by laws which the State may change, the widow's
right of dower may be considered a part of the "intestate laws of the State.' "
INSURANCE-PRooF or Loss-Tnm oF MAILING.-PABODY V. SATERLEE,
59 N. B. Rep. 818 (N. Y.).-A condition in a fire insurance policy, requiring
the insured to furnish proofs of loss within a certain time, is broken when the
insurer does not receive them until after such time, although insured mailed
them before the time had expired. O'Brien, Martin and Vaun, JJ., dissenting.
Where notice is required to be given and no express method is pr , .. r
it must be personal notice as required bythecommon law. Rathbun v. Acker,
18 Barb. 393. And where in such case notice is sent by mail, there is only a pre-
sumption of receipt by the company. Susquehanna M. F. Ins. Co. v. Toy Co.,
87 Pa. St. 424. Where a policy required that notice of losses be given by
mail, the Supreme Court of New York held that the sending of such notice by
mail only raised a presumption that it was received. Hodgkins v. Mont-
gomery, 34 Barb. 213. But the Court of Appeals in the same case (41 N. Y.)
held it to be conclusive, which was certainly more in accord with the intent of
the parties as evidenced by the express provision of the policy.
INSURANcE-WARRANTY-INTOXICANTS-HABITuAL USE.--SuPREmE LODGE,
K. OF P. v. FOSTER, 59 N. E. Rep. 876 (Ind.).-To the question, "To what
extent do you use intoxicating liquors ?" an applicant for life insurance an-
swered: "Not at all." Held, to mean not an habitual use.
The language of the application must receive a reasonable construction;
one within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was con-
summated. The only purpose of requiring the insured to state in the ap-
plication to what extent he used alcoholic liquors, was to guard against the
risk from insuring the life of one who was in the habit of using them to such
an excess as to imperil his health. Grand Lodge v. Belcham, 145 Ill. 308.
LIABILITY OF LANDLORD-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-INURY TO TENANT'S
GooDs.-PEERLEss MFG. Co. v. BAGLEY ET AL., 85 N. W. 568 (Mich.).-
Landlord, in accordance with agreement with tenant, engaged an experienced
contractor to put in 'a fire extinguishing apparatus. Contractor negligently
put in a sprinkler which fused at too low a temperature, in consequence of
which damage resulted to tenant. Held, the landlord was liable.
Defendant relied upon the rule that when one employs a competent, expe-
rienced and independent contractor, he is not liable for defects. See Devlin v.
Smith, 89 N. Y. 470; Miller v. Railroad, 125 N. Y. 1180. This rule, however,
is not applicable to case at bar, for the landlord owes an absolute duty to
tenant and cannot acquit himself of liability by delegating that duty to. an
independent contractor. Wertheimer v. Saunders, 95 Wis. 573; Sturges v.
Theological Society, 130 Mass. 414.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SEwERs-OBSTRUCTIONS--IURIES TO ABUT-
TING OWNER-NEGLIGENCE.-TALCOTT v. CITY or NEW YORK, 69 N. Y. Supp.
360.-Action to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of
an obstruction in a public sewer, occasioned by no other cause, except the or-
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dinary use to which it put. Held, that where a sewer under the control of a
city becomes obstructed by ordinary use, and an abutting owner's property
is injured thereby, a presumption of negligence arises calling upon the defend-
ant for an explanation, and upon failure to show that watchfulness and care
had been exercised to keep the sewer in proper condition, a finding of negli-
gence would be sustained.
This case is in accord with the majority of decisions which hold that
when a sewer has been determined upon and is constructed, the duties of con-
structing it properly and keeping it in good condition and repair are main-
tained, and that negligence in the performance of those duties will render the
city liable for damages resulting therefrom. Mills v. City of Brooklyn, 32N. Y. 489; Boston v. City of Syracuse, 37 N. Y. 54; Mayor v. Furze, 3 Hill
612; Horn v. Burnhoof, Ct. Ap. Conn.
MUNICIPA.L CORPORATIONS--SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS-CoNSTITUTIONALITY-
ZELURDER v. BARBER ASPHALT PAVING CO., 106 Fed. 103.-A statute, where-
by municipal corporations are given the right to assess abutting property
owners for the total cost of street improvements without any opportunity
first being given for an examination into the question of benefits, is unconsti-
tutional.
It has long been settled that municipalities may have the legal power con-
ferred upon them to assess the cost of street improvements against the prop-
erty located in the neighborhood of such improvements. ill. C. R. R. Co. v.
Decatur, 147 U. S. 190; Banman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548. Though such as-
sessments are a form of taxation, yet even there the power of the legislature
is not extended so far that it may authorize the taking of property without
benefit being conferred on those assessed. The present case follows closely and
relies almost absolutely on Village of .Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269.
NEGLIGENcE-DEATH OP HORSE-FRIGHT.--LEEV. CITY OF BURLINGTON, 85
N. W. 618 (Ia.).-The negligent operation of a street roller so frightened a
horse that it dropped dead. Held, no recovery from the city.
This is an unusual case and involves a very nice point of law. It is a set-
tled rule, as to human beings, that n6 recovery can be had for injuries result-
ing from fright, where no immediate personal injury is received. Ewing v.
Railroad Co. (Pa. Sup.), 23 At. 340; Spade v. Railroad Co. (Mass.), 47
N. E. 88. The court considers the same rule to be applicable to animals.
RAILROADS-F=IREs--BURDEN O PROOF-IMPROVED APPLANCES. -WHITE
v. NEW YORE, P. & N. R. Co., 38 S. E. 180.-Held, when a fire is caused
by sparks thrown from a locomotive, that if it appears that the company
owning the locomotive has discharged its duty by providing and keeping in re-
pair the most approved appliances for preventing the throwing of sparks,
there could be no recovery for damages caused thereby.
Fire caused by sparks from a locomotive is prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. R. R. v. Rogers, 76 Va. 457. The using and keeping in repair of ap-
proved appliances is sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence. K im-
ball v. Borden, 44 S. B. 45.
WATERS AND WATER CoURSES-DAHS-OVERFLOW-PREscIpTVE RIGHT.
-CHARNEY V. SHAWNO WATER POWER, &C., Co., 85 N. W. 507 (Wis.).-
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Defendant bought a mill dam which had been constructed forty-eight years
before. Plaintiff asks that damages caused to his land by flowing of the dam
be assessed. Held, that though the dam was constructed across a navigable
stream without authority from the legislature, a prescriptive right might have
been acquired as against private owners, but since the injury done to the land
of the plaintiff had not been as great during the entire prescriptive period as
at the time the action was brought, no such prescriptive right had been ac-
quired.
If this is law there are very few good prescriptive rights in existence. A nui-
sance arising from the pollution of a stream, in order to acquire a prescriptive
right, would have to be maintained every day of the week and at all hours of
night and day for the requisite period. We conceive the law to be that a nui-
sance acquires a prescriptive right against individuals when it has been
brought about for the requisite period by a business operated in the natural
and usual *ay to accomplish the ends for which it was established. If the
twentieth season after the building of the dam was a dry one, this does not
destroy the greater prescriptive right acquired during the first season, which
may have been a wet one. Indeed, the substantial increase of injury may be
actionable, but it does not take away the previously acquired right. See Sher-
lock v. Louisville, &c., R. R. Co., 115 Ind. 22.
REIMBURSEMENT OF EXECUTORS.-IN RE McKAY's ESTATE, 68 N. Y. Sup.
925.-Executors in good faith paid off a mortgage when, by 1 Rev. St. p. 749,
sec. 4, the land should have iSassed to the legatees subject to the incumbrance.
Held, that the executors were entitled to reimbursement out of any funds held
by them or the testamentary trustees, for the benefit of the residuary legatee.
This seems to be the first case on this point of law under the statute.
NEW TRIAL-JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT--MERITORIOUS DEFENSE-NEGLI-
GENCE OF COUNSEL.-DENSERAW V. SAILLANT, 48 Atl. 668 (R. I.).-Defendant
showed by affidavit that he had a probable defense, but that through the neg-
ligence of his counsel in failing to appear, judgment by default was rendered
against him. Held, defendant was entitled to a new trial.
It is not the policy of courts to grant a new trial undersuch circumstances.
Donnelly v. McAdams, 13 Atl. 108. In New Jersey by statute (2 Gen. St., p.
2597, see. 324) ajudgment will be opened where injury results to one through
the neglect or mistake of his attorney infailing to file a plea.
NrEWSPAPERS-REFUSAL TO SELL TO DEALERS-RIGHT OF ACTION.-COL-
LINS v. AMERICAN NEWS Co., 63 N. Y. Supp. 638.-A complaint in an action
by a newsdealer, alleging that an association of publishers of certain New
York papers bad agreed to cut off his supply unless he desisted from dis-
tributing, with the newspapers, circulars calculated to make him a compet-
itor with the newspapers in the business of advertising, does not constitute
a cause of action.
From the evidence it would seem that defendants do not propose to
interfere with plaintiff's business, but merely refuse to aid him in injuring
their own advertising business. No one can be compelled to sell his goods
or labor to one with whom he does not wish to deal, merely because his
refusal to do so may cause loss to him who wants them. Allen v. Flood
(1898), App. Cas. 1; Reynolds v. Associations, 63 N. Y. Supp. 303.
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MUNICIPALITIES-LIMITATION ON INDEBTEDNESS-ASSESSED VALUATION.-
CITY OF CHICAGO V. FISHBURN, 59 N. E. 791 (Ill.).-Whenever a city is
prohibited by law from becoming indebted exceeding 5 per cent. of the value
of the taxable property, this amount is to be computed, not upon the full
value, but upon the assessed value, although both values are recorded.
The point raised in this case appears to be new, at least to the
Illinois courts, and the importance of the restriction is further increased
by the magnitude of the expenditures of great cities to-day, and by the fre-
quency of similar restrictions limiting taxation. When the legislature does
prescribe such a limit, it must be observed, unless it is a total prohibition
of all taxation. Beck v. Allen, 58 Miss. 143. The court is materially as-
sisted to its conclusion by the fact, of which it takes judicial notice, that
even where the statute requires that taxes be assessed on the full value,
the action is universal of listing property at part only of its actual value.
PUBLIC CONTRACTS-MATERIAL-INTERSTATE COMMERCE. -PEOPLE EX
REL TREAT V. COLER, 59 N. E. 776 (N. Y.).-The New York Labor Law of
1897 provided that no stone should be used on any municipal work unless
prepared for use within the State. Held, in contravention of the interstate
commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Parker, CJ.. dissenting.
This decision advances the position of the New York courts as regards
the Labor Law of 1897, one step further than that taken in People ex rel
Rodgers v. Coler, 59 N. E. 716, where the power of the legislature to en-
act such a restricting law is denied. Under the Constitution of the United
States the citizens of each State have the right to resort to the markets
of every other for the sale of their products, and business may not be ham-
pered by State boundary lines. People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1. It is
strongly argued in the dissenting opinion that the agreement in the contract
in question to use only stone prepared in the State was binding between the
parties, but the court holds that when the contractor's agreement rests upon
the statute, it must fall with it.
